













Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 March 2016




Gunter Schubert, Lin Rui-hua and Jean Yu-Chen Tseng, « Taishang Studies », China Perspectives
[Online], 2016/1 | 2016, Online since 01 March 2017, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6900  ; DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6900 
© All rights reserved
Introduction
The story of Taiwanese investment in mainland China has often beentold over the past two decades, and its economic and political reper-cussions continue to interest many Taiwan scholars. (1) After the first
Taiwanese entrepreneurs set foot on the Chinese mainland in the late 1980s,
they soon became important energisers in China’s market transformation
processes and contributed substantially to China’s economic rise. Faced with
the mounting pressure of rising labour costs in the structurally changing
economy back home, Taiwanese entrepreneurs shifted their companies and
much of their investment capital to the mainland, making best use of the
low wages, cheap land, and tax breaks granted by local Chinese governments
eagerly pursuing their respective development agendas. (2) During the 1990s
and 2000s, cross-strait economic interaction became increasingly intensive
despite the fact that the Taiwanese government strictly regulated investment
flows to China. Cross-strait direct trade was finally legalised in 2008, when
the KMT returned to power after eight years of DPP rule. At around the same
time, the economic climate on the mainland changed dramatically for Tai-
wanese entrepreneurs as a result of structural adjustments made to the Chi-
nese economy and the global financial crisis, which had a strong impact on
the demand for Taiwanese goods. (3) Moreover, increasing Chinese competi-
tion from private and state enterprises and their privileged treatment by local
authorities brought new challenges for Taiwanese entrepreneurs, who were
forced to accept that their advantages in the early days of “reform and open-
ing” had gone. (4) Today, they have to fight hard to survive in the shark basin
called the China market, and although many of them do extremely well, oth-
ers, particularly those belonging to the labour-intensive industries, face strong
pressure to either upgrade, change their production lines, or seek new desti-
nations, for instance in Southeast Asia, in order to continue their businesses.
Research on Taiwanese entrepreneurs operating in China (Taishang 台商)
has only recently been noted as an emerging field in Taiwan studies that
stretches across different disciplines and covers a wide range of topics, in-
cluding Taishang economic behaviour, (national) identity change, social in-
tegration in China, and political agency. (5) The nexus between these different
approaches to the study of Taishang, as we argue, was and still is the un-
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This article is based on a presentation made at the 2nd World Congress of Taiwan Studies, held at
the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, from 18-20 June 2015.
1. For comprehensive accounts, see You-tien Hsing, Making Capitalism in China. The Taiwan Con-
nection, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988; Chen Teh-sheng (ed.), Jingji quanqiuhua yu 
taishang dalu touzi: celüe, buju yu bijiao (Economic Globalisation and Taishang Mainland Invest-
ment: Strategy, Composition and Comparison), Luzhou, Jingdian wenhua, 2005; Mai Rui-tai, Dalu
taishang de jingying celüe (Management Strategies of the Mainland Taishang), Taipei, Keji tushu,
2006; Shin-yuan Tsai, Globalization Effects on China's Influence on Taiwan Economy, Frankfurt/M.,
Peter Lang, 2006; Chen The-sheng (ed.), Kunshan yu Dongguan taishang touzi. Jingyan, zhili yu
zhuanxing (Taiwanese Investment in Kunshang and Dongguan: Experiences, Governance and Trans-
formation), Taipei, INK, 2009; Chen-yuan Tung and Chia-ko Hung, “The Estimation of Aggregate
Statistics for Taiwan-Invested Enterprises in China: 1988-2008,” China: An International Journal,
Vol. 10, No. 3, 2012, pp. 119-132; Françoise Mengin, Fragments d'une guerre inachevée. Les 
entrepreneurs taïwanais et la partition de la Chine (Fragments of an Unfinished War: Taiwan’s 
Entrepreneurs and the Partition of China), Paris, Karthala, 2013. 
2. See Charles H. C. Kao and Steve Chu-chia Lin, “The Economic Impact of Taiwan's Investment in
the Mainland,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 30, No. 6, 1994, pp. 16-27; John Q. Tian, “‘Like Fish in Water’:
Taiwanese Investors in a Rent-Seeking Society,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1999, pp. 61-94;
Karen M. Sutter, “Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for Cross-strait
Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 2002, pp. 522-540; Hsu Ssu-ch’in. and Chen Teh-sheng
(eds), Taishang dalu touzi ershi nian: jingyan, fazhan yu qianzhan (Taiwanese Investment in China
During the Past Two Decades: Experiences, Developments and Prospects), New Taipei City, INK,
2011; Keng Shu, Lin Rui-hua et al. (eds), Taishang yanjiu (Taishang Studies), Taipei, Wunan, 2012.
3. Most importantly, the Chinese government promulgated a new Labour Contract Law, which went
into effect on 1 January 2008. This stipulates that employees of at least ten years’ standing are
entitled to contracts that protect them from being dismissed without cause. Also, the law requires
employers to contribute to employees' social security accounts and sets wage standards for em-
ployees who are on probation and working overtime. All our Taishang respondents at the time
complained that this new law would raise labour costs significantly and have a negative effect
on the already deteriorating business environment. The introduction by Chinese local governments
of new environmental protection regulations and the turn toward attracting “clean” and high tech
industries while discriminating against polluting and labour-intensive production since the mid-
2000s have further contributed to this development. 
4. See Chun-yi Lee, Taiwanese Business or Chinese Security Asset? A Changing Pattern of Interaction
between Taiwanese Businesses and Chinese Governments, London, New York, Routledge, 2012;
Chen T.-s. and Huang C.-c., “Dalu taishang zhuanxing shengji: zhengjing beijing yu changuanxue
hudong” (Transformation and Upgrading of Taiwanese Entrepreneurs: Political Background and
Interaction between Businesspeople, Officials and Academicians), in Tung Chen-yuan and Cao 
Xiaoheng (eds), Liang'an jingji guanxi de jiyu yu tiaozhan (Challenges and Opportunities for Cross-
Strait Economic Relations), Taipei, Hsin-rui wen-chuang, 2013, pp. 73-95. 
5. See Shu Keng, Gunter Schubert et al., “Taiwan and Globalisation. Reflections on the Trajectory of
Taishang Studies,” in Kuei-fen Chiu, Dafydd Fell et al. (eds), Migration to and from Taiwan, London,
New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 25-41. 
China p e r s p e c t i v e sArticle
Taishang Studies
A R i s ing  o r  Dec l in ing  Resea rch  F i e ld?
GUNTER SCHUBERT,  L IN  RUI -HUA,  AND TSENG YU-CHEN
ABSTRACT: The study of Taiwanese entrepreneurs who live and invest on the Chinese mainland (Taishang) has only recently started to
attract attention. Taishang have been referred to as a “linkage community” that connects Taiwan and the Chinese mainland through its
economic undertakings, political influence, and social experiences as a migrant community. Against this background, this article clari-
fies the extent to which Taishang have contributed to and shaped the ongoing process of cross-strait interaction and the development
of cross-strait policies. It revisits the field of Taishang studies, takes stock of the knowledge that this field has generated so far, and ex-
plores future directions for meaningful research. 
KEYWORDS: Taishang, “linkage community,” cross-strait integration, cross-strait relations.
derlying hypothesis that this social group constitutes a specific “linkage
community” (6) connecting the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and driving
forward their ongoing integration – with all the potential advantages and
disadvantages this process entails. In the realm of cross-strait economic
relations, the “linkage effect” is probably the most obvious: first, Taishang
investment has helped the Chinese economy become what it is today. (7)
Although their significance as energisers of China’s economic rise is dwin-
dling, Taishang are still an important factor in China’s ongoing market trans-
formation due to their steady capital investment and the transfer of
management skills and technology. (8) At the same time, Taiwanese entre-
preneurs help Taiwan’s export economy by linking it to the Chinese market
and global value chains, which are arguably becoming increasingly “sinified.”
Taishang also play a significant role in facilitating access to Taiwan for Chi-
nese capital, although this is a rather murky area and a politically contested
issue (see below). Last but not least, there is the ever-present suspicion in
Taiwan that influential tycoons are conspiring with KMT elites and the Chi-
nese government to pull Taiwan irrevocably into China’s orbit, solely for
their own personal benefit. Concerning cross-strait migration and social
relations, Taiwanese entrepreneurs, as long-term residents on the mainland,
have gained the attention of sociologists who are interested in the condi-
tions of their (non-)integration in Chinese society, in the question of identity
change, and also in the impact of cross-strait marriages on Taiwanese im-
migration policies and family patterns. However, Taishang as a social con-
stituency here often merge with other migrant groups – factory managers,
white collar workers, relatives, students – to form a broader category of
“Taiwan compatriots” (Taibao 台胞) living on the mainland. In terms of
cross-strait political relations, political scientists have largely focused on
the possible role played by Taishang as agents or lobbyists of China’s Taiwan
policy. (9) They have also discussed Taiwanese entrepreneurs in the context
of an alliance uniting the political and economic elites on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, in what André Beckershoff has described as a Gramscian
“hegemonic project,” with the objective of making cross-strait integration
the only possible option in the minds of ordinary Taiwanese. (10) One further
issue is the extent to which Taishang constitute an autonomous collective
actor with the power to act independently of political elites and to influence
the policy-making process in both China and Taiwan. (11)
It is the intention of this article to highlight some of the major insights
that have been gained through Taishang studies to date in all three areas
of cross-strait relations, i.e. economic, social, and political. The common
theme that connects all these studies, as has been mentioned above, is
the assumption that Taishang are a “linkage group,” which is of key im-
portance when it comes to understanding the dynamics of cross-strait re-
lations and the scope and limits of (further) cross-strait integration in all
the areas mentioned. The final part of the article discusses the question
of whether this assumption still holds sway, given the changing cross-
strait political economy, as well as the possible future directions of scien-
tific inquiry in the field of Taishang studies. (12)
Taishang and cross-strait economic relations
There can be no doubt that Taiwanese entrepreneurs have been an im-
portant factor in China’s economic rise during the last 25 years. They
have provided much of the capital investment and management skills
that China needed to build up competitive industries. Local Chinese gov-
ernments focused on economic development in their jurisdictions and
successfully attracted Taishang by offering cheap land and labour that
was no longer available in Taiwan proper. The Pearl River Delta (Zhusan-
jiao 珠三角), most notably Dongguan City and its adjacent townships,
became the centre of labour-intensive industries under Taiwanese own-
ership, producing textiles, shoes, umbrellas, furniture, and electronic ap-
pliances of all kinds. Shenzhen, as early as 1988, became the site of the
biggest factory of the Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd. (Foxconn), the
world’s largest electronics contract manufacturer, founded by the Tai-
wanese tycoon Kuo Tai-ming. In the course of the late 1990s and early
2000s, ever-increasing amounts of Taiwanese capital were flowing into
the Yangtze River Delta (Changsanjiao 長三角) and the Shanghai metro-
politan area (including the prefectural cities of Suzhou, Wuxi, Ningbo,
and Hangzhou), with the county-level city of Kunshan soon to become
the centre of Taiwanese investment in new high-tech industries, partic-
ularly semiconductors and integrated circuit devices, precision machin-
ery, solar technology, and biochemistry. (13)
These developments aroused the keen interest of political economists, the
earliest cohort of scholars engaging in research on Taishang. They discussed
the dangers of a “hollowing out” of Taiwan’s economy vis-à-vis the oppor-
tunities resulting from cross-strait trade and investment liberalisation, a topic
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6. According to Wei Yung’s early definition, a “linkage community” consists of “a group of people
who have had such extensive social, cultural, commercial, or other types of contacts with the
people and society of the opposite system that they have developed an understanding, sensitivity,
and empathy with the people and society across boundaries.” Delimiting a research programme
oriented toward “linkage communities,” Wei suggested that “instead of focusing our attention on
the role of the state, the problems of sovereignty, the decisions of the elite, the legal process, and
the political structure, we will turn more to the orientation of the population; the development
of shared values and norms between people of different systems; the direction of deliberation
and debate in the representative bodies at the central and local levels; and the overall volume as
well as intensity of actual individual and group interactions between the two political systems
within a partitioned society.” See Yung Wei, “From ‘Multi-System Nations’ to ‘Linkage Communi-
ties’: A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 33,
No. 10, 1997, pp. 1-19, 7-8. See also Shu Keng’s approach to the concept: Shu Keng, “Understand-
ing Integration and ‘Spillover’ across the Taiwan Strait: Towards an Analytical Framework,” in Gunter
Schubert and Jens Damm (eds), Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century: Domestic, Regional
and Global Perspectives, London, New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 155-175. 
7. See Shelley Rigger and Gunter Schubert, “From ‘Borrowing a Boat to Go to Sea’ to ‘Learning How
to Build a Ship’: Taiwan's Contribution to China's Economic Rise and Cross-strait Integration,” in
Steve Tsang (ed.), The Taiwan Impact on China (working title), Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan,
forthcoming.
8. Since wage differentials across the Taiwan Strait are decreasing in many industries, Taishang who
find themselves facing structural pressure on the mainland have started to return to Taiwan. How-
ever, as our interview data suggests, most of these companies scale back significantly upon “going
home.” Many Taishang complain that although labour costs are once again becoming more com-
petitive in Taiwan because of the continuous rise in labour costs on the mainland, the main ob-
stacle in the way of new investments on the island is the substantial labour shortage, i.e, a
shortage of cheap labour, in the manufacturing sector. One of the main requests directed at the
Taiwan government, therefore, is for the liberalisation of state immigration policies to allow more
foreign workers to enter the Taiwanese labour market – a hotly contested issue, since such a policy
is bitterly opposed by those who fear that this will result in Taiwanese workers finding themselves
under even more pressure.
9. See Tse-Kang Leng, “State, Business, and Economic Interaction across the Taiwan Strait,” Issues &
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, 1995, pp. 40-58; Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert, “Agents of Taiwan-China
Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Inte-
gration,” Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 10, 2010, pp. 287-310; Keng Shu, Gunter Schubert et al. (eds),
Taishang yanjiu (Taishang Studies), Taipei, Wunan, 2012, pp. 301-339.
10. See André Beckershoff, “Seizing the Transnational – Ideology, Hegemony, and the Doubling of
China-Taiwan Relations,” Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-21.
11. See Gunter Schubert, “Assessing Political Agency across the Taiwan Strait: The Case of the 
Taishang,” China Information, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2013, pp. 51-79. 
12. Since 2006, we have regularly conducted fieldwork (in both China and Taiwan) on Taiwanese en-
trepreneurs engaged in business in China, interviewing several hundred Taishang and factory man-
agers representing diverse industries and companies of different sizes in the Pearl River Delta, the
Shanghai metropolitan area (including Kunshan), and in Northern, Central, and Southern Taiwan.
13. See Shu Keng, “Developing into a Developmental State: Changing Roles of Local Government in
the Kunshan Miracle,” in Yuan-Han Chu and Leng Tse-Kang (eds), Dynamics of Local Government
in China during the Reform Era, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, pp. 225-271.
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that has not lost any of its steam to this very day. (14) Other scholars analysed
the set-up and operating mode of new mainland-based networks connecting
Taiwanese businesses, and the establishment of new production clusters and
value chains linking Taiwan to the global economy. (15) Government-business
relations and the specific strategies employed by Taiwanese entrepreneurs
to set up guanxi with local Chinese cadres to protect and nurture their busi-
nesses were another focus of research. Hsing You-tien’s “blood, thicker than
water” approach explained the success of Taiwanese direct investment in
southern China in terms of the interpersonal networks established between
Taishang and local Chinese officials. (16) These networks were based on two
conditions: first of all, local governments had sufficient leeway to flexibly
apply central state laws and regulations to accommodate the business re-
quirements of Taiwanese investors. Second, cultural and linguistic affinity fa-
cilitated communication and the setting up of guanxi based on the “principle
of gift exchange” that is so revered in the Chinese world. This perspective
clashed to some extent with the institutionalist thinking of scholars such as
Wu Jieh-min, who highlighted the significance of guanxi, but placed these
networks in the context of rent-seeking and patronage. (17) Local Chinese gov-
ernments, acting as patrons, helped Taiwanese entrepreneurs by making use
of their discretion to apply government regulations and exploiting their gate-
keeper position to provide important market information. Most importantly,
they reduced the transaction costs of Taishang by offering them preferential
(selective) treatment in the realm of official tax payments and administrative
fees, while cashing in on extra-budgetary payments to be delivered by their
clients, Taiwanese investors. Cultural and linguistic affinity as an objective
analytical category, Wu argued, was less useful to explain this patron-client
relationship than “diachronic” institutional affinity resulting in the actuali-
sation of an established cultural practice: 
Taiwanese experienced, during the period of rapid economic growth
under authoritarian rule from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, much
that is similar to what has been happening in reform-era China, in-
cluding extensive regulations, rampant rent-seeking, and bribery and
corruption. These experiences have remained fresh in their minds.
Now Taiwanese businessmen can “transpose” the rules of the game
to China. In this way, the costs for Taiwanese businessmen to manip-
ulate guanxi networks on the mainland are relatively low vis-à-vis
foreigners. This deep structural affinity in development experience
can better explain the characteristics of guanxi webs between the
two societies. (18)
From this perspective, guanxi networks become a “convenient tool for in-
vestors to work out a cooperation protocol with local partners under specific
policy conditions,” (19) which secures relative certainty in a complex insti-
tutional environment – although this may turn into immediate uncertainty
once a central policy is changed and promoted rigorously top-down, for in-
stance, in large-scale anti-corruption campaigns. Consequently, the effi-
ciency of guanxi networks varies with the institutional environment and
certain structural conditions, a fact that Taishang have obviously had to face
since the beginning of the Xi Jinping era.
Lee Chun-yi, for her part, identified and analysed different periods in which
the relationship between local Chinese governments and Taiwanese entre-
preneurs gradually changed: from the early days, when Taishang capital was
desperately needed and eagerly invited by local Chinese governments, to
the recent past, when Taiwanese entrepreneurs lost their privileged position
and were increasingly forced to compete with domestic competitors in ma-
turing Chinese markets. (20) In fact, today, the mainland Taishang face a harsh
economic environment with increasing labour and capital costs, stricter reg-
ulation (most notably concerning environmental protection and tax obli-
gations), unfair competition (from better connected and protected Chinese
entrepreneurs), and a general policy line that strives to gradually do away
with labour-intensive industries in the Pearl River Delta (and elsewhere) and
replace them with high tech industries. Consequently, scholars have come
to look at how Taishang react to this pressure and what their counter-strate-
gies – leaving China, diversifying and upgrading their product lines, moving
“in-land” and attempting to enter the Chinese domestic market, returning
to Taiwan, or closing down – entail for Taiwan’s economy, cross-strait eco-
nomic relations, and Taiwan’s relative position in global value chains. (21) All
in all, the above-summarised research has been very much informed by the
specific modes of production, company organisation, investment strategies,
and social networks of Taiwanese entrepreneurs to ensure smooth and suc-
cessful business operations in China. 
A different strand of research in the realm of cross-strait economic rela-
tions, often conducted by sociologists, has dealt with intra-firm labour re-
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14. Interestingly enough, scholars working on the impact of capital investment outflows to China on
Taiwan’s economy have found few indications of negative consequences on Taiwan’s unemploy-
ment rate, total exports, and labour productivity in the manufacturing sector. See Tun-jeng Cheng,
“Doing Business with China: Taiwan's Three Main Concerns,” Asian Program Special Report, No.
118, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004; Douglas B. Fuller,
“The Cross-strait Economic Relationship's Impact on Development in Taiwan and China,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2008, pp. 239-264; Douglas B. Fuller, “ECFA's Empty Promise and Hollow
Threat,” in Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle (eds), Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma
Ying-jeou. Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges, London,
New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 85-99; Lai Su-ling and Chang Hsiu-yun, “Taishang fu dalu touzi
zaocheng Taiwan chanye kongdonghua de misi?” (Does Taiwan's Foreign Investment in China
Cause Hollowing-out of Taiwanese Industries?), Dianzi shangwu xuebao (Journal of E-Business),
No. 14, 2012, pp. 233-255. Rising unemployment seems to be much more related to global eco-
nomic crises or ongoing structural change in the manufacturing sector, while the Chinese economy
offers Taiwan’s labour force a fall-back position. Fuller’s 2008 article is particularly telling with re-
gard to the effectiveness of industrial adjustment to the “moving” out of Taiwan’s major industries
in the electronics sector (semiconductors, flat-panel displays, mobile devices). He argues that the
high end of the entire production process has so far remained in Taiwan and has ensured the
global competitiveness of these businesses.
15. See Tse-Kang Leng, “Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol.
38, No. 5, 1998, pp. 494-509; Jenn-Hwan Wang and Chen-Kuai Lee, “Global Production Networks
and Local Institution Building: The Development of the Information-Technology Industry in
Suzhou, China,” Environment and Planning, Vol. 39, No. 8, 2007, pp. 1873-1888.
16. See You-tien Hsing, “Blood, Thicker Than Water: Interpersonal Relations and Taiwanese Investment
in Southern China,” Environment and Planning, Vol. 28, 1996, pp. 2241-2261; You-tien Hsing,
“Building Guanxi across the Straits: Taiwanese Capital and Local Chinese Bureaucrats,” in Aihwa
Ong and Donald Nonini (eds), The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, London,
New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 143-164. 
17. See Jieh-min Wu, “Strange Bedfellows: Dynamics of Government-business Relations Between Chi-
nese Local Authorities and Taiwanese Investors,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 15,
1997, pp. 319-346; Jieh-min Wu, “State Policy and Guanxi Network Adaptation in China: Local
Bureaucratic Rent-seeking,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2001, pp. 20-48. 
18. Jieh-min Wu, “State Policy and Guanxi Network Adaptation in China: Local Bureaucratic Rent-
seeking,” art. cit., p. 39.
19. Ibid., p. 48.
20. See Chun-yi Lee, “Between Dependency and Autonomy – Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and Local Chi-
nese Governments,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, pp. 37-71; Chun-yi
Lee, Taiwanese Business or Chinese Security Asset? A Changing Pattern of Interaction between
Taiwanese Businesses and Chinese Governments, London, New York, Routledge, 2012; Chun-yi
Lee, “From Being Privileged to Being Localized: Taiwanese Businessmen in China,” in Kuei-fen Chiu,
Dafydd Fell et al. (eds), Migration to and from Taiwan, op. cit., 2014, pp. 57-72.
21. See Weng Hai-ying and Feng Xiao-yun, “Jinrong haixiao hou Guangdong taishang de zhuanxing
shengji dongxiang ji tiaozhan” (Trends and Challenges Concerning the Transformation and Up-
grading of Guangdong's Taishang after the Financial Tsunami), Yatai jingji, No. 2013/1, pp. 128-
134; Cao Xiaoheng, Gao Yi et al., “Dalu taizi qiye zhuanxing de diaoyan yu sikao: jiyu Zhangsanjiao,
Zhusanjiao deng taizi qiye jujiqu diaoyan fenxi” (Survey and Reflections on the Transformation of
Taiwan-invested Companies on the Chinese Mainland: Survey Analysis of the Gathering Districts
of Taiwan-invested Companies in the Pearl River and Jiangzi River Deltas), in Tung Chen-yuan and
Cao Xiaoheng (eds), Liang'an jingmao guanxi de jiyu yu tiaozhan (Challenges and Opportunities
for Cross-strait Economic and Trade Relations), Taipei, Hsin-rui wen-chuang, 2013, pp. 95-111.
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lations and their development under the conditions of intensifying global
capitalism. Some scholars have argued that Taishang companies have had
to adapt their management model of family or “ethnically”-based Taiwanese
leadership to the challenges of necessary expansion and organisational
complexity, hence reducing the social and class distance between Taiwanese
and mainland Chinese staff. (22) However, others have tended to believe that
this distance, as manifested most visibly in the hierarchical relations be-
tween Taiwanese managers and Chinese workers and the military-style
management of many Taiwanese firms, would prevail, hence setting a Tai-
wanese company clearly apart from its domestic and foreign competi-
tors. (23) Today, it is quite clear that Taishang-owned companies face serious
problems pertaining to leadership succession, as the “second generation”
offspring are little inclined to take over from their parents because of the
huge challenges that arise when trying to adapt a family business to the
changing market environment in China – a problem that, as we found in
our fieldwork, domestic private entrepreneurs also have to face. Conse-
quently, in order to secure their future, Taiwanese companies will probably
need to recruit increasing numbers of Chinese leading personnel, which in
turn will probably gradually lead to flatter intra-firm hierarchies and labour
relations – a topic that has not yet been thoroughly researched. (24)
Meanwhile, the question of strengthening or restricting cross-strait eco-
nomic relations seems to be polarising Taiwanese society more than ever.
The “Sunflower Movement” in early 2014 insisted on a more thorough
screening of cross-strait trade agreements in order to protect Taiwan from
Chinese economic (and political) domination. Among its main targets, in ad-
dition to the Ma government, were the big conglomerates (caituan 財團),
which, it was alleged, were only interested in making a profit and were ready
to sell out Taiwan’s sovereignty in exchange for a lucrative trade deal with
China. In fact, the “government-business” nexus has become the main enemy
of those opposing the KMT’s China policy. All new cross-strait trade deals
have been stalled and must wait for the 2016 presidential elections. But no
matter what the outcome may be, the real question is: What can Taiwan ex-
pect from further economic integration across the Taiwan Strait? Does it
mean that the island economy will be drained of all its vitality and eventually
colonised by mainland Chinese capital as parts of Taiwan’s highly politicised
civil society predict? (25) Or are those voices, including Taiwan’s entrepreneurs,
correct who insist that cross-strait economic integration is the only way out
for the sluggish Taiwanese economy – by forcing Taiwan’s domestic compa-
nies to face global competition and helping its most innovative businesses
to become an integral part of an evolving global economy? As our fieldwork
has shown, many Taishang are frustrated with their compatriots who, they
say, fear to “ride the Chinese tiger” from which there is no escape in any case.
They are disillusioned with their government, which is unable to help them
to solve their problems in China or to enforce policies that could improve
their economic opportunities back home so that many of them would not
be forced to leave Taiwan in the first place. In a way, nothing has changed
since the early days of the economic “turn to China” in the late 1980s, when
Taiwan was dragged, irrevocably, into the “Chinese orbit” by economic struc-
tural change and the entrepreneurial spirit of Taishang. 
Taishang and cross-strait social relations
As has been mentioned above, Taishang were the first group of Taiwanese
to take up long-term residence in China and were soon identified by soci-
ologists as a social constituency that could assist in testing the “compati-
bility” of the societies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since the early to
mid-2000s, numerous studies have investigated the extent to which 
Taishang (Taiwanese) have become integrated in Chinese society and how
they perceive their host society. This research focus was closely connected
to the question of identity change over time and how this change might
influence Taishangs’ perception of their Taiwanese homeland. This strand of
research was therefore interested in the process of cross-strait social inte-
gration and, although more implicitly, its impact on the political relationship
between Taiwan and China. Scholars in this field also linked their findings
on cross-strait migration to the evolving field of transmigration studies that
figures so prominently in contemporary sociology. These studies have over-
whelmingly ascertained that the social integration of Taishang – and the
Taiwanese in general – in Chinese society is limited at best. 
In a number of studies, Taishang are described as primarily economic an-
imals who are not very much concerned with identity issues when it comes
to selecting an investment site or operating a business in a challenging en-
vironment, and tend to focus on their supply chains and cluster structures.
However, our fieldwork has also shown that Taiwanese entrepreneurs of
mainlander descent see things quite differently from bentu Taishang and
perceive their migration to China as some sort of “homecoming.” (26) These
entrepreneurs are described as well positioned to integrate smoothly into
their host society, where money and economic success counts for much.
However, other studies have pointed at the importance of the identity fac-
tor for Taishang when relating themselves to their social environment. For
instance, Gunter Schubert found that Taiwanese entrepreneurs remain very
much attached to their homeland no matter how long they have worked
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and lived in China. (27) However, they tend to display a “situational identity”
in the sense that they switch between defining themselves as “Taiwanese”
or “Chinese” depending on the social context, often invoking descriptors
such as “transnational,” “cosmopolitan,” “global,” or “hybrid” to position
themselves beyond a simplistic “either-or” antinomy. (28)
Nevertheless, there is much evidence in our data to suggest that Taishang
have a deeply entrenched Taiwanese identity that changes very little over
time and is simply overlain by the above-quoted “transnational speak” for
avoiding awkward discussions with their fellow Chinese. (29)
In general, Taishang (and other Taiwanese people) perceive a considerable
“identity gap” between themselves and their Chinese host society with re-
spect to cultural (“ethnic”) identity, lifestyle and habitus, and political (civic,
national) identity. (30) Against this background, Lin Rui-hua put forward the
hypothesis that the fact of belonging to the same class might change iden-
tity more than other group-specific features, thus facilitating the social in-
tegration of Taiwanese migrants in China. (31) However, her findings failed to
verify this assumption: despite the fact that belonging to the same class
creates bonds between Taiwanese and Chinese in high-end residential quar-
ters in urban China, it does not eradicate the feeling of being distinctly Tai-
wanese in terms of lifestyle, habitus, and culture, which sets all the
Taiwanese apart from their Chinese environment. Apparently, at this point
in time, class formation has not led to a changed identity, although this
could still eventually happen.
Lin Ping, for his part, has written extensively on the identity experiences
of different groups of Taiwanese in China, for example, Taiwanese residents,
mainlander Taiwanese, and female Taiwanese teenagers in Taiwanese
schools. (32) The quintessence of his work is that no matter what specific so-
cial constituency one is dealing with, Taiwanese identity – although it may
be gradually changing and evolving into an “in-between-category” that no
longer fully matches what is defined as Taiwanese identity in Taiwan proper
– does preclude the genuine social integration of Taiwanese migrants in
China; they remain “Taiwanese” in some way, building their identity, at least
in good part, by othering “the Chinese.” (33)
A different strand of research concerned with cross-strait social integration
has dealt with Chinese immigration in Taiwan, and particularly with the issue
of cross-strait marriages. Scholars have studied the impact of these mar-
riages on Taiwan’s social fabric, including the ways in which mainland
spouses adapt to life in Taiwan and the ways in which they are perceived
by the Taiwanese, as well as civil society mobilisation and NGO formation,
which are often discussed in conjunction with the struggle of mainland
spouses for the liberalisation of Taiwan’s immigration policies. (34) Although
this literature does not specifically refer to Taishang, it shows quite clearly
that the social integration of Chinese (brides) in Taiwan touches upon ques-
tions of identity, nationalism, traditional values, partisan politics and na-
tional security, which makes it a much more politically sensitive issue than
the social integration of Taiwanese migrants on the mainland. 
Currently, cross-strait student exchanges are on the rise, and the fact that
ever more Chinese companies are allowed to do business in Taiwan points
toward a future with steadily increasing numbers of Chinese white-collar
workers and professionals in Taiwan. At the same time, young Taiwanese en-
trepreneurs do not hesitate to leave for China to start a business or set up
branch offices of their companies back home. In fact, the trend toward
strengthening cross-strait social relations is irrevocable, no matter how the
political elites and decision-makers on both sides may view it. This will con-
tinuously enhance mutual knowledge and, hopefully, empathy, thus laying
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a solid and enduring foundation for friendly civic relations across the Taiwan
Strait in the future. Certainly, Taishang will have an important role to play
here, as they have in the past.
Taishang and cross-strait political relations
Apart from being crucial for cross-strait economic and social relations,
the significance of Taiwanese entrepreneurs for the political relationship
across the Taiwan Strait has triggered the most vigorous and controversial
discussions among partisan political observers and journalists. Taishang were
either perceived as an important, even powerful, constituency to facilitate
communication across the Taiwan Strait, especially in times of frosty bilat-
eral relations such as those during the Chen Shui-bian era, or as apolitical
animals who found it easy to turn their backs on Taiwan and would even
be willing to “sell out” Taiwan if this offered them opportunities for making
good profits in the booming Chinese economy. In their efforts to make sense
of the available empirical data, political scientists have presented a more
balanced picture. While it is beyond argument that Chinese government
bureaucracies at the national and local levels are decisive for Taiwanese en-
trepreneurs because of the discretion they enjoy to shape their business en-
vironment, scholars have seriously questioned the idea that Taishang could
be easily forced into becoming agents of China’s Taiwan policy: the leeway
for the Chinese government to enforce sanctions against Taishang in order
to influence the Taiwanese government is indeed limited due to the eco-
nomic and political costs such action would entail. (35)
Particular attention has been paid to the rise of Taiwanese Business Asso-
ciations (TBAs) on the mainland since the late 1990s, when scholars began
to investigate the capacity of these organisations to effectively safeguard
Taishang interests and influence local and national politics in China. In spite
of early optimism that the TBAs constitute effective Taishang interest
groups, such an assessment was soon relativized when scholars found that
the TBAs were unable to overcome the constraints that the CCP regime im-
poses on each and any social organisation operating in China. (36) TBAs
tended to function as service platforms for their members to distribute busi-
ness-relevant information and, most importantly, helped individual Taishang
companies solve specific problems related to tax deductions, access to land,
labour disputes, and business conflicts among Taishang. They were, however,
unable to influence local Chinese policy-making in any meaningful way, al-
though the relations between local TBAs and Chinese governments have
gradually become more institutionalised. (37) TBAs have certainly played an
important role in setting up guanxi between Taiwanese entrepreneurs and
Chinese local cadres as much as between the latter and government officials
and legislators (at both local and national levels) in Taiwan. In this sense,
they continue to play a significant role in smoothing out cross-strait polit-
ical relations. (38) At the same time, however, TBAs have never been able to
develop sufficient meaningful collective agency to pursue an autonomous
political agenda for safeguarding or promoting Taishang interests. Neither
have they been an effective political agent for the PRC government in its
quest for unification, although the TBAs tend to do what is expected of
them in this regard, most notably mobilising Taishang to return to Taiwan
and vote for the “pro-China” KMT in important elections. (39)
In Taiwan proper, Taishang join numerous business associations that also
lobby for their interests on the Chinese mainland. (40) However, as our recent
fieldwork has shown, the input of these associations in the policy-making
process is more limited than might be expected. They may be able to inform
the Taiwan government of various Taishang-related problems in China, to
offer advice on specific policy proposals, or even come up with their own
suggestions, but many of Taiwan’s domestic business associations are still
very much shaped by their corporatist past and tend to see themselves as
conduits between their members and the government rather than as full-
fledged interest groups pressuring the government on behalf of their clients.
Many Taishang to whom we have spoken do not think that these organisa-
tions are of much help and complain that the business sector is, in fact,
widely excluded from cross-strait trade negotiations. This reproach is cer-
tainly exaggerated, since the government is very much aware of the specific
problems faced by Taiwanese entrepreneurs on the mainland, and there is
regular communication between both parties at the regular (and highly cer-
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emonial) meetings between government officials and the heads of the
mainland TBAs during the spring and autumn festivals, as well as when in-
formation is supplied informally or gathered by officials of Taiwan’s Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF), one of whose main tasks is to serve the Tai-
wanese business community on the mainland. Moreover, there can be no
question that Taiwan’s China policy under the Ma administration since 2008
has been largely advantageous to their interests, leading to direct trade and
transport across the Taiwan Strait, the ECFA, and other agreements that,
even if they have not yet been cleared by the legislature, are of crucial im-
portance for Taiwanese companies operating on the mainland. 
Generally speaking, the formation of a coherent Taishang constituency with
visible influence on Taiwan’s China policy has been hampered by a number
of factors: internal fragmentation, in terms of company size, sort of business
(labour-intensive vs. capital-intensive/high tech), social background, (na-
tional) identity and political orientation, and extreme caution on the political
front for fear of ideological stigmatisation in both China and Taiwan, which
would be detrimental to protecting their overall economic interests. For these
reasons, Taishang keep a low profile and abstain from any kind of public in-
volvement in domestic politics or even collective action. (41) Most impor-
tantly, however, the Taiwanese government – whether KMT or DPP-based –
has to exercise extreme caution when dealing with China in order to avoid
being branded as “selling out” to Beijing, which could entail the risk of elec-
toral defeat. As a matter of fact, the delicate political position of the Taiwan
government constrains the efforts of the business sector to push its agenda
at the national policy-making level and also limits, arguably, the effectiveness
of existing cross-strait government-business networks in influencing or ma-
nipulating policy-making in Taiwan. (42) If a “hegemonic project” is being pur-
sued by the Chinese government, “unificationist” (and rent-seeking) KMT
elites, and cross-strait capitalists to bring Taiwan into the “Chinese orbit,” as
Wu Jieh-min, André Beckershoff and others contend, it certainly faces a tough
opponent in the shape of Taiwan’s vital democracy. (43) In fact, as our fieldwork
has shown, the “logical alliance” between a “pro-China” ruling party, such as
the KMT, and Taiwanese entrepreneurs with substantial business stakes in
China is fraught with tension, disappointment, and frustration because of
the latter’s widespread feeling that they are being ignored by the Taiwanese
government, which is often criticised for being hesitant and ineffective in
helping Taishang. This holds also true for those big tycoons who have the
most clout to press their course vis-à-vis policy-makers, as they are “sand-
wiched” between the governments of both sides of the Taiwan Strait and
hence can only look out for a clientelist relationship with little “steering ca-
pacity.” However, this is hard to measure.
All things considered, the significance of Taiwanese entrepreneurs in the
shaping of cross-strait political relations may be much more limited than
is often assumed by Taiwan scholars (and partisan observers), even if we (as
yet) lack the empirical data to assess the policy impact of the cross-strait
networks and hidden policy circles that cause so much commotion in con-
temporary Taiwan.
Outlook
The common thread running through this article is the assumption that
Taiwanese entrepreneurs operating on the Chinese mainland, who are often
long-term residents in China, constitute an important “linkage community.”
This means that they connect both sides of the Taiwan Strait with their eco-
nomic, social, and political thinking and behaviour, and by substantially
shaping the cross-strait policy-making process in both China and Taiwan.
Drawing on the relevant literature and the results of many years of field-
work, this article has investigated the extent to which this hypothesis can
be verified. In terms of cross-strait economic relations, the “linkage effect”
has certainly been the most visible over the years, with Taiwan’s economy
becoming increasingly dependent on China and both sides, at least since
2008, being interested in pushing integration further ahead.
There are some serious questions concerning the consequences of this
process for Taiwan’s economy against a background of steady outflows of
capital, expertise, and skilled labour. This debate is very much related to Tai-
wan’s domestic politics and the protracted struggle between the ruling and
opposing parties over the best China policy approach. One position in this
debate holds that if new cross-strait trade agreements and investment reg-
ulations are continuously blocked by Taiwan’s legislature, as well as fought
over in the streets, Taishang business operations in China will be of little
benefit for Taiwan: No taxes will be paid, no profits will be repatriated, no
new investment will be undertaken on the island proper. However, other
voices have been raised, domestically, to point out that Taiwan has faced
this situation for a long time in any case, and must reduce its dependency
on China for national security reasons. Hence, the government should do
what it takes to induce Taiwanese entrepreneurs to return to Taiwan or help
them reorient to other destinations. However, these voices are opposed by
many experts and policy-makers in Taiwan who are convinced that cross-
strait economic exchange is gradually helping Taiwan’s companies to up-
grade and become more competitive, and that Chinese capital investment
in Taiwan offers a precious opportunity for the island’s corporate and finan-
cial sector to go global. It is clear that the business sector supports this view
and would prefer to “face the Chinese dragon” rather than run away from it
– a futile endeavour in any case, as any Taishang would quickly add.
Taishang migration to China continues to be essential for cross-strait so-
cial integration as well, but as was noted earlier, social integration has its
limits, since the Taiwanese residing in China have so far remained a distinct
group in terms of their self-perception and the response of the host society,
and there is little reason to believe that this will change any time soon. Even
N o . 2 0 1 6 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 35
41. Rather, the majority of Taiwanese entrepreneurs “bowl alone” by providing financial support for
individual politicians during elections in order to be able to garner their support later in case of
“need.” Although this strategy ensures that they have substantial influence on business in Taiwan’s
domestic politics, it is focused on individual interest-seeking and does not imply political coordi-
nation among Taishang. Hence their seemingly limited impact on national policy-making.
42. Wu Jieh-min, “Yi shangye moshi zuo tongzhan: kua haixia zhengzhi guanxi zhongde ‘zhengzhi
dailiren’” (Making United Front Work a Business: Political Agency in the Cross-strait Government-
business Relations), Unpublished paper, Institute of Sociology, Academica Sinica, Taipei. Wu iden-
tifies eight such networks: the Lien Chan family, the KMT-CCP Forum (Guo-Gong luntan), the
Cross-Strait CEO Summit (Zijinshan fenghui), the Boao Forum for Asia (Boao yazhou luntan), the
Cross-Strait Peace Forum (Liang’an heping luntan), the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Forum
(Haixia liang’an jingmao luntan), the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association
(TEEMA), and the different Taiwanese Business Associations (TBAs) in China, including the na-
tional-level Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (Taiqilian).
43. See André Beckershoff, “The KMT-CCP Forum: Securing Consent for Cross-Strait Rapprochement,”
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2014, pp. 213-241; André Beckershoff, “Seizing
the Transnational – Ideology, Hegemony, and the Doubling of China-Taiwan Relations,” Spectrum:
Journal of Global Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-21; Steve Tsang (ed.), The Vitality of Taiwan:
Politics, Economics, Society and Culture, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. One highly con-
troversial issue in contemporary Taiwan is media monopolisation by “China-leaning” Taishang;
the Want Want Group’s purchase of the China Times, China TV and CTI Television in 2008 is still
referred to as the most critical case in this regard. Scholars have pointed at enforced pro-China
reporting by the China Times since then, “embedded marketing” (the purchase of news reports
by China from Taiwanese media), and direct subsidies for the Want Want Group (and others)
granted by the Chinese government. See, for example, Chien-Jung Hsu, “China's Influence on Tai-
wan's Media,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2014, pp. 515-539; Ming-yeh T. Rawnsley and Chien-
san Feng, “Anti-Media Monopoly Policies and Further Democratisation in Taiwan,” Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2014, pp. 105-128. 
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if they speak the same language and share a common cultural tradition,
“blood is not thicker than water,” and most Taiwanese keep a distance be-
tween themselves and their Chinese environment. The turn to China, it
seems, is predominantly instrumental and only rationalised “ex post” as
being culturally logical. The political stakes between China and Taiwan are
far too high to allow the “one-China principle” to be internalised in a way
that would entail a level of social integration where the simple fact of living
together amicably is gradually bringing about the formation of a unified
awareness of “all being Chinese, period.” 
Concerning political relations between Taiwan and China, it has been
shown that the capacity of Taishang to have an impact on policy-making
on both sides may have been over-estimated. They have not made an effort
to become a collective actor by developing genuine organisational clout.
Their informal power is dependent on political patronage and social net-
working, and these goals are pursued solely for the benefit of their individual
business interests. For the time being, Taishang do not pursue coordinated
strategies to safeguard their interest, nor have they developed any mean-
ingful collective identity. Finally, the governments on both sides of the Tai-
wan Strait set them clear limits in terms of political agency. In fact, all the
talk about mighty and manipulating tycoons notwithstanding, Taiwanese
entrepreneurs hardly have the potential to figure as a pressure group in
cross-strait relations, although they do help to maintain a number of com-
munication channels across the Taiwan Strait. (44)
This analysis provokes the question of which direction Taishang studies
should take in the future, and also what the relevance of this research field
is as a whole. Taiwanese entrepreneurs will remain a significant driving force
of continuous economic change in China and the “sinification” of global
value chains, hence (political) economists will find it interesting to watch
the strategies they employ in order to adapt to the challenges of a changing
Chinese economy, also from a comparative perspective. Moreover, the ques-
tion of the “hollowing out” of Taiwan by continuous outflows of capital in-
vestment and skilled labour to China will remain on the research agenda,
as will the gradual expansion of Chinese capital investment in Taiwan and
its impact on the Taiwanese economy. Sociologists will continue to study
the factors that facilitate and hamper the social integration of the Taiwanese
in China and of the Chinese in Taiwan, and the impetus of cross-strait mi-
gration for research on global migration. 
As far as political scientists are concerned, one particular topic of interest
would be a more systematic investigation of the collusion between Taishang
and political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait in what has been called
a “hegemonic project” that is, allegedly, striving to control the Taiwanese
economy, manipulate the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people, and
eventually bring about cross-strait “political integration.” Against this back-
ground, the monopolisation of strategic sectors within Taiwan’s economy
by mainland Chinese capital, assisted by Taishang, may become a “hot topic”
in the coming years. The cross-strait government-business nexus as the an-
tipode of Taiwan’s revitalised civil society will then become a major focus
of scholarly interest, especially if the DPP returns to power and the KMT
then decides to go back to its second track party-to-party counter diplo-
macy that it so aptly initiated in the mid-2000s. Political scientists may
also take a second look at Taishang interest representation and goal-ori-
ented agency in mainland China by, for instance, investigating the changing
relations between local governments and the Taishang community and the
(possible) evolution of TBAs in the changing political environment across
the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the question of identity change on the part of
both the Taiwanese and the Chinese that may be triggered by cross-strait
interaction over time will remain an interesting research topic for both so-
ciologists and political scientists.
To put it in a nutshell: Taiwanese entrepreneurs will remain an interesting
object of scientific inquiry, since they are believed to be a meaningful cross-
strait “linkage community.” As long as Taiwan scholars are interested in the
development of cross-strait relations, some of them will certainly examine
the thoughts and actions of Taishang, because they constitute an indispen-
sable reference point for any analysis of the opportunities and pitfalls that
globalisation presents for Taiwan.
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44. Some would argue that this is a good thing, because entrepreneurs who can control the state are
more than inclined to subvert it to their group-specific profit-seeking, to the detriment of the
public good. However, democratic theory holds that the business sector can as much undermine
a democratic order as strengthen it by playing a responsible part within civil society.
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